Online ISSN 2286-0266
Print ISSN 1223-0685
© 2026 Œconomica by ASE & SOREC
 
Emmanuel Olusegun STOBER
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti
The accelerating militarization of diplomacy in the Gulf has transformed coercion from a supplementary instrument of statecraft into the dominant grammar of regional interaction. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, retaliatory strikes, and mounting risks to energy markets and maritime trade, the article examines the strategic logic and limitations of the contemporary “strike-forward” approach pursued by the United States and Israel. Drawing on theories of coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and escalation management, the analysis argues that military pressure alone is increasingly counterproductive: while capable of temporarily degrading capabilities, it simultaneously incentivizes nuclear hardening, dispersal strategies, reduced transparency, and wider regional destabilization. The paper further explores how repeated cycles of coercion weaken verification mechanisms, amplify threats to Gulf infrastructure and shipping corridors, and undermine the legitimacy of long-term containment efforts. In response, the study advances the concept of a Middle-Power Coalition for Gulf Stability (MPC-GS), centred on Gulf states with direct exposure to escalation and supported by external middle powers possessing significant diplomatic, commercial, and energy interests in regional stability. Rather than advocating idealistic de-escalation detached from geopolitical realities, the proposed framework seeks to institutionalize coercion within a broader architecture of negotiated restraint, verification, maritime security, infrastructure resilience, missile risk reduction, and managed strategic competition. The article concludes that a sustainable Gulf Security Compact represents not a return to earlier diplomatic formats, but a necessary adaptation to an increasingly fragmented and multipolar international order.

ŒCONOMICA no. 1-2/2026
Keywords: coercive diplomacy, Gulf security, Iran nuclear program, strike-forward strategy, escalation management, deterrence, Middle East geopolitics, middle powers, maritime security, geoeconomics, regional stability, strategic competition, security architecture
JEL: F51, F52, F53, F59, H56, Q34
Coercive Diplomacy in the Gulf and the Limits of the Strike-Forward Strategy: Toward a Middle-Power Coalition for Regional Stability