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Octavian-Dragomir JORA
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti

Ştiinţa economică regăseşte pe lista preocupărilor (şi) analiza naturii, cauzelor şi efectelor stimulentelor, fie instituţionalizate, continue, fie prezente în instanţe discrete; stimulentele sunt circumstanţe care motivează acţiunea umană. Economiştii sunt de acord că stimulentele pot fi “bune” sau “rele”, iar calificarea vine din contribuţia la producţia de avuţie, una, am adăuga, în rit paretian: creşte producţia de avuţie-proprietate fără a se pierde proprietate. Unul dintre stimulente rele este “hazardul moral”.


ŒCONOMICA nr. 4/2011
CRIZĂ ŞI ECONOMII CONTEMPORANE: INSTITUŢII ŞI INSTANŢE ALTERNATIVE
Cosmin MARINESCU
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti
This study aims to give the general frame of scientific research on transaction costs and economic performance, in fact the institutional economics field, emphasizing the necessity of rethinking the neoclassical theory. Recent research on institutions and development proves that, by reducing transaction costs, the institutions protecting property rights are decisive for economic development.

ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: institutional economics, institutions, economic development
JEL: B15, D23, O43
Instituţii şi dezvoltare economică
Mihaela IACOB
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA), as a distinctive tool for public investment projects evaluation laying in the portfolio of the governmental authorities, strives to replicate the market in establishing economic standards for the measurement of their success, while the government’s actions are in explicit contradiction with the market test. In this paper, CBA is being scrutinized from two angles.


ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: free market, government intervention, utility, welfare, cost-benefit analysis, mainstream economics, Austrian economics
JEL: D01, D61, D62, D63, H21, H43, I18, I38
Fetişizarea analizei cost-beneficiu în decizia publică de alocare a resurselor
Nicoleta ODAE
Academia Română

An innovation system is aimed at developing, diffusing and using innovations. Since a nation or a country represents a relevant level of analysis, the national innovation systems were first considered. However, there can be different types of innovation systems. In order to analyze an innovation system, it is necessary to identify the functions of the respective system.


ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: National Innovation System, public innovation policy, functions of innovation systems, determining factors of innovation processes, evolutive feature, organizations, institutions, structural capital
JEL: O32, O38, O57
Sistemele naţionale de inovare
Nicolae DĂNILĂ
Academia de Studii Economice din Bucureşti

In the current framework outlined by Eurozone crisis effects, by the high level of debt service starting next year and by the Romanian banking system outlook, our country needs actions and solutions at national level, resorting firstly to domestic resources and to our intellectual ability, solutions which should prove sustainable and rigorous and which should strengthen our domestic and international situation.


ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: Eurozone, crisis, financial stability, international cooperation, central banks
JEL: E58, E61, E66, F59, G01, G18
Poate contribui la stabilitatea financiară o bancă de importanţă sistemică având capital autohton?
Andrei RĂDULESCU
SSIF Broker
The Eurozone is confronted within the current crisis with unprecedented challenges. The measures adopted and implemented by the policymakers over the past quarters were not perceived credible by the financial markets, given the dimension of macroeconomic disequilibria in the region, the persistence of asymmetric shocks and the indecision among political leaders.

ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: European Monetary Union, syncronisation of economies, structural GDP
JEL: C22, E32
Sincronizarea economică în Zona Euro: perspectiva structurală
Alexandru GEORGESCU
Cercetător independent

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as one side (North Korea) overleverages its position, while the other side makes unproductive compromises.


ŒCONOMICA no. 4/2011
Keywords: United States, North Korea, Kim Jong-il, Theory of Moves, Nash equilibrium, six party talks, cycle of aggression, information and power asymmetry, regressive induction
JEL: C72, C73, C78, C79, D72, D74, D81, D82, F51, F52, F54, F55, N4
Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice