In the present article, we identify the corporation as a pluri-personal consistent “aggregate”, subject to or vitiated by societal moral hazard. We homogenize, only for this purpose, the otherwise rather distinct entrepreneurial-capitalistic and the managerial “viewpoint”, leaving aside the principal-agent tensions that arise between them. We treat the shareholders - managers tension as irrelevant, focusing within this simplified framework on situations in which the “corporate” actors (the shareholding-managerial aggregate) gain in integrum social privileges, rights on undue third party resources or, on the contrary, are prejudiced (in integrum) by third parties. Either way, the “key character” in this picture proves to be the State, which institutionalizes such guilty or, respectively, victimizing behaviours. We consider the “guilty corporation” that which succeeds (while tolerated / encouraged by State) in acquiring resources from third parties, without the righteous owners’ consent (achieving this either by “material” redistribution – explicit transfer of expropriated resources – or “virtual” redistribution – implicit rents thanks to favourable regulations), internalizing moral hazard behaviour in its usual functioning; we define the “victim-corporation” as that which is expropriated (materially, virtually) by third parties (e.g., rival corporations), which take comfort from increasing costs for competitors.